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SECULAR RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS WRONGS?
FAMILY LAW, RELIGION AND WOMEN IN ISRAEL

PASCALE FOURNIER,* PASCAL MCDOUGALL**
& MERISSA LICHTSZTRAL***
INTRODUCTION
I. WHAT CRITICAL LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH TO THE “FIELD”?
II. FAILURES OF THE CIVIL LAW
III. RELIGIOUS EMPOWERMENT: SANCTIONS AND THEIR LIMITS
CONCLUSION
Even should civil marriage eventually be introduced
into Israel as a possible option for all persons, in
addition to religious marriage, the change will indeed be great symbolically, but the legal schizophrenia with all its complexities and difficulties will
not disappear, and new problems will arise. . . . As
long as our social reality is as complex and conflictridden as it is, the legal conflicts which it engenders
will be our fate in the future as well.1
PROLOGUE
To the sound of a wailing Middle Eastern wind instrument
and spoken Hebrew prayers, the movie fades in to main characters
Meïr and Rivka’s bedroom at dawn.2 Amos Gitai’s Cannes Festival–
featured Kadosh then launches into a bleak portrait of life in Mea
Sharim, an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood of Jerusalem.3 The film
depicts Rivka’s decay as she is ostracized and repudiated by her
husband on account of being infertile and is driven to isolation and
despair by the men of her community.4 The film also presents the
* Associate Professor and Vice-Dean, Research at the Civil Law Section, Faculty of
Law, University of Ottawa. I am grateful for funding received to support this project from
the Québec Bar Foundation, the Foundation for Legal Research, Borden Ladner Gervais,
the Law Foundation of Ontario and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada.
** Graduate of the LL.L. Licence en droit Program, Faculty of Law, Civil Law Section,
University of Ottawa, 2011.
*** Graduate of the J.D. National Program, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section,
University of Ottawa, 2011.
1. Pinhas Shifman, Family Law in Israel: The Struggle Between Religious and
Secular Law, 24 ISR. L. REV. 537, 551–52 (1990).
2. KADOSH (Kino International 1999).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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arranged marriage and domestic violence suffered by Malka, Rivka’s
sister, leading to her ultimate exile from the Orthodox community.5
The treatment of women by Israeli family law provokes in the viewer
unrest, disgust, and revolt. Gitai’s film, a powerful aesthetic tour
de force, was acclaimed by critics outside of Israel.6 The Wall Street
Journal praised its depiction of “universal themes,” yet characterized
it as “foreign in the extreme, an austere and shocking portrait of
daily life in Mea Shearim.” 7 There is some startling truth in Gitai’s
presentation. But is this artist’s gaze nevertheless deforming Jewish
women’s daily realities?
INTRODUCTION
Israeli family law has been the object of much criticism for its
treatment of women.8 According to halacha (Jewish law),9 a man
holds all the power to grant his wife a religious divorce (the get).10
If a Jewish woman is entitled to a get and has not received one due to
her husband’s refusal, she will be called an agunah (chained wife),11
a status which entails several dire consequences. First, if the woman
contracts a new civil marriage, the relationship is considered adulterous under Jewish law.12 Therefore, an agunah is never permitted
to religiously marry this other man. Second, any children born to a
woman who has never received a get are labeled mamzer.13 Such children are automatically excluded from Judaism: they are illegitimate,
and may never marry anyone but another mamzer.14
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Joe Morgenstern, Review/Film: ‘Erin Brockovich’ Has Both Beauty and
Brains—And That’s Just the Script, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2000, at W1 (reviewing Kadosh).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Carmel Shalev, Women in Israel: Fighting Tradition, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 89, 92 (Julie Peters & Andrea
Wolper eds., 1995) (“[S]ubstantive Jewish laws of marriage and divorce are pervaded by
a double standard that is patently discriminatory.”); Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of
Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and Women’s Equality, 10 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459, 462 (2004) (“The close ties between religion and the state in
Israel clearly violate women’s rights to equality.”).
9. This article focuses on Jewish law, but we acknowledge that Israel is a multinational and culturally diverse country, which comprises notable Muslim and Christian
Arab populations, among others.
10. See Shifman, supra note 1, at 544–45.
11. Id. at 539.
12. See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate
Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 154, 171 n.76 (2003).
13. Shalev, supra note 8, at 92.
14. Isaac S. Shiloh, Marriage and Divorce in Israel, 5 ISR. L. REV. 479, 494 (1970);
see also Shalev, supra note 8, at 92 (“Such a child may not marry a Jew, nor may her
offspring for ten generations.”).
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Israel’s family law regime, in large measure dating back to the
Ottoman Millet system, confers jurisdiction over divorce and marriage to (religious) rabbinical courts.15 Though Israel is not explicitly
a theocratic Jewish state, but rather an ambiguous “Jewish state,”
religion nevertheless occupies a central place in Israeli life. As put by
Martin Edelman: “Although Israel is a secular democracy, it proudly
proclaims itself as the State of the Jewish people. What that means
is far from clear. . . . There is no denying, however, that at times
Orthodox Judaism functions in the Israeli polity as if it were the
official state religion.” 16
Indeed, the divorce procedures, which are the focus of this article,
are governed strictly by religious law.17 There is no civil marriage of
which to speak.18 This has led many commentators of the agunah
problem to argue that since Western Jews can ignore the (private)
religious sphere and remarry within the civil sphere, they fare better
than their Israeli counterparts.19 This has also led many to advocate
the introduction of civil marriage in Israel.20 Likewise, the adoption
15. The Rabbinical Courts Jurisdictions (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, 7
LSI 139, No. 64 § 1 (1952–1953) (Isr.). The socio-legal heritage of the Ottoman and
Mandate periods is often neglected in Zionist historiography. See Assaf Likhovski,
Between “Mandate” and “State”: Re-thinking the Periodization of Israeli Legal History,
19 J. ISRAELI HIST. 39, 44 (1998). But see Yoram Shachar, The Dialectics of Zionism and
Democracy in the Law of Mandatory Palestine, in THE HISTORY OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: ISRAEL 1917–1967, at 95–102 (Ron Harris et al. eds., 2002) (discussing
the Mandate period). When the British set out to govern Palestine at the close of the
First World War, this arrangement was maintained by article 53 of the Palestine Order-inCouncil of 1922. Shiloh, supra note 14, at 483 & n.10. When the state of Israel was created
in 1948, the “status quo” arrangement, Ben Gurion’s compromise with religious parties
and authorities, provided that the creation of the state would in no way compromise
“the values and way of life of religious Jews.” Hanna Lerner, Entrenching the StatusQuo: Religion and State in Israel’s Constitutional Proposals, 16 CONSTELLATIONS 445,
447 (2009). This arrangement confirmed that “Orthodox courts would have jurisdiction
in issues of personal law (particularly matters of marriage and divorce).” Id.
16. MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 3–4 (1994).
17. Shifman, supra note 1, at 538. That being said, certain ancillary areas of divorce
law, such as custody and matrimonial property, are governed by civil law. Id.
18. A bill was passed in May 2010 to allow civil marriage for partners who are both labeled as “lacking a religion.” HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED
SOCIETIES 214 & n.16 (2011). However, it seems to apply to only a few Israelis. Id.
19. Marsha Freeman, Women, Law, Religion, and Politics in Israel: A Human Rights
Perspective, in JEWISH FEMINISM IN ISRAEL: SOME CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 57, 66
(Kalpana Misra & Melanie S. Rich eds., 2003); see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 16–17 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (describing
how Western cultures have moved away from their “patriarchal pasts”); Stopler, supra
note 12, at 171–72.
20. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 19, at 71 (“While many argue that interfaith marriage holds the seeds of destruction for the Jewish people, this argument is not as compelling with respect to Israel as it is with respect to the diaspora. . . . Those who want to
remain entirely separate would always be able to do so.”); Yuval Merin, The Right to
Family Life and Civil Marriage Under International Law and Its Implementation in the
State of Israel, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79 passim (2005) (advocating for civil
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of civil statutory regimes for some matters ancillary to divorce21 has
been interpreted by secularists as a sign of social and legal progress.22
Under this narrative, the matters ruled by civil law are presented as
having “been ‘conquered’ by the secular, substantive law which has
replaced the religious law.” 23
The article will attempt to test out this claim and to comprehend Israeli women’s condition by analyzing the operation of the
Sanctions Law,24 a religious legislation intended to address the
plight of the agunah. Through field work and interviews with Israeli
Jewish women, this article will attempt to assess the concrete impacts of religious and secular family law on women. Our field work
in Israel25 clearly suggests that religious women’s interests are
entwined, diffused and recast in manifold unexpected ways across
the secular/religious divide, compromising any policy option that tries
to exclude one or the other. Hence, the “religious” cannot be depicted as simply reflecting gender oppression. Rather, our interviews outline that women’s experiences with both the civil and religious sphere
are uneven, ever changing and conditioned by the complexities of intersecting legal orders.
The article is divided as follows. Part I will describe our methodological approach, and Part II will come to terms with the failures
and defects of the existing civil law in Israel, outlining that while
in some situations civil law is indeed profitable to women, in others
it fails to empower them. Specifically, poor access to justice in the
civil realm, the loss of financial rights contained in the religious marriage contract, and the possibility for the husband to extort civil entitlements will be analyzed. Part III will turn to the religious law
applicable to marriage and evaluate the Sanctions Law’s efficiency
in addressing the plight of the agunah. Specifically, it will inquire
marriage to ensure equality); see also Etta Bick, Sectarian Party Politics in Israel: The
Case of Yisrael Ba’Aliya, the Russian Immigrant Party, in ISRAEL AT THE POLLS 1996, at
121, 137 (Daniel J. Elazar & Shmuel Sandler eds., 1996); Frances Raday, Women in Law
in Israel: A Study of the Relationship Between Professional Integration and Feminism,
12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 525, 551 (1996); Pinhas Shifman, State Recognition of Religious
Marriage: Symbols and Content, 21 ISR. L. REV. 501, 501–06 (1986).
21. See discussion infra notes 48 and accompanying text.
22. See Shifman, supra note 1, at 538.
23. Id.
24. Rabbinical Tribunals (Implementation of Divorce Judgments) Law 5755-1995,
ISRAEL’S COURTS OF LAW AND TRIBUNALS 114 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Sanctions Law].
25. This project is part of Professor Fournier’s wider socio-legal research project,
entitled “Jewish and Muslim Women Negotiating Divorce in Western Europe and
Canada,” which examines the ways in which religious women navigate in the interplay of
legal systems and religious norms in various multidimensional social and legal contexts.
The research project includes formal interviews with Jewish and Muslim women in
Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
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into some of Jewish women’s successes in empowering themselves
through religious law. This part will end by assessing some of the
Sanctions Law’s limits, as revealed by our field work. It will assess the
ways in which the Sanctions Law sometimes remains unenforced and
link this phenomenon with the indeterminacy of law, which makes
it permeable to ideological preferences of the adjudicator. Through a
socio-legal methodology that incorporates elements of critical legal
pluralism and infuses them with insights from the critical legal studies analysis of the State, this article aims to contribute to better informed public policy discussions on the interactions between religious
deviance and the normative gaze of state law.
I. WHAT CRITICAL LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH TO THE “FIELD”?
Our field work in Israel is based on interviews conducted with
six women who were all once married according to Jewish law.26
The women interviewed varied in their level of religious commitment,
although all were practicing Jews. Most of the women labeled themselves as “traditional,” meaning that they kept the basic Jewish
commandments such as kashrut (Jewish dietary laws) and observed
Sabbath. Two women were of the Orthodox denomination. Four
women were already divorced and two were struggling to obtain
their get. Four of these women had the Sanctions Law applied
against their husbands by the rabbinical court, a process whereby
their husbands were either put in jail, had their driver’s licenses
taken away, had their passports confiscated, and/or were disqualified
from certain honors in the synagogue. The interviews lasted about
one hour each and concerned demographics, religious background,
the divorce, the civil legislation, and the religious Sanctions Law.27
We began looking for interview participants by contacting university professors as well as various organizations and centers established in Israel that help women, financially and otherwise, in legal
matters pertaining to the process of obtaining a get, a method which
was approved by application to the Research Ethics Committee of the
University of Ottawa. We met with representatives from the following
26. This article focuses on Jewish women, but field research has been completed
amongst Israeli Muslim women in the Fall of 2011 to complement the perspectives
offered in this article. This research is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.
27. The interviews were conducted with a Hebrew–English translator. Four interviews
were held in Hebrew with a translator who asked the questions under the supervision of
Merissa Lichtsztral, who understands Hebrew, and two interviews were held in English
in one-on-one conversations. Four of the interviews took place at coffee shops, while two
women invited us to their homes to conduct the interview.

338

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 18:333

organizations28: Yad L’Isha,29 Mavoi Satum,30 the International
Coalition for Agunah Rights31 and the Ruth and Emmanuel
Rackman Center for Advancement of Women’s Status at Bar Ilan
University.32
This article is influenced by the methodological and theoretical
framework of critical legal pluralism.33 It embraces a philosophical
commitment to the subjective construction of law by legal subjects
and its methodological commitment to “the field.” Indeed, to grasp
the complex condition of the Israeli agunah and the effectiveness of
the Sanctions Law, the insights of legal pluralism are most useful.
In recent decades, a deepened legal pluralism was developed, one
which goes beyond pluralizing normativity and directly questions the
very notion of positivity. The Canadian manifestation of this movement has been headed by Roderick A. Macdonald, the flag-bearer of
critical legal pluralism. Critical legal pluralism understands the law
as encompassing “how legal subjects understand themselves and the
law.” 34 For critical legal pluralists, “law arises from, belongs to, and
responds to everyone,” 35 and one cannot only understand law through
the ontological tools of “legal evangelicalism,” which “breeds a reliance
on the rituals, catechism, and creed of official institutions that focus
on the word (especially on the definitive pronouncements of the curia
that sits at the top of an institutional hierarchy).” 36 Legal subjects
shape and produce law as much as Parliament does, through their
28. All of our interview participants were found through the help of representatives
from these organizations. The assistance and kindness of these people to connect us with
these women was greatly appreciated, and the project could not have been a success
without them.
29. About Yad L’Isha, YAD L’ISHA, http://www.yadlaisha.org.il/page-eng.aspx?id=52
(last visited Feb. 13, 2012). Most of the women interviewed were extremely grateful to
Yad L’Isha, which provided them with legal aid and the disposal of rabbinical court
advocates who have significant expertise with the Sanctions Law.
30. MAVOI SATUM, http://www.mavoisatum.org/page6.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
31. About ICAR, THE INT’L COALITION FOR AGUNAH RTS., http://www.icar.org.il/about
-icar-our-mission.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
32. The Ruth and Emanuel Rackman Center for Advancement of Women’s Status,
BAR-ILAN U., http://law.biu.ac.il/en/node/197 (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
33. For a genealogy of legal pluralism, see John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?,
24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 passim (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal
Pluralism, 22 LAW SOC’Y REV. 869 passim (1982); Franz von Benda-Beckmann & Keebet
von Benda-Beckmann, The Dynamics of Change and Continuity in Plural Legal Orders,
53 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 passim (2006); see also Angela Campbell, Wives’
Tales: Reflecting on Research in Bountiful, 23 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 121, 130–32 (2008)
(applying a critical legal pluralist approach to the empirical study of polygamy).
34. Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, What is a Critical Legal
Pluralism?, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 25, 36 (1997).
35. RODERICK ALEXANDER MACDONALD, LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW 8 (2002).
36. Roderick A. Macdonald, Custom Made—For a Non-Chirographic Critical Legal
Pluralism, 26 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 301, 306 (2011).
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constructive creativity and normative interpersonal interactions.37 As
put by Kleinhans and MacDonald:
Legal subjects are not wholly determined; they possess a transformative capacity that enables them to produce legal knowledge
and to fashion the very structures of law that contribute to constituting their legal subjectivity. This transformative capacity is
directly connected to their substantive particularity. It endows
legal subjects with a responsibility to participate in the multiple
normative communities by which they recognize and create their
own legal subjectivity.38

This outlook led us to analyze Israeli law through the eyes of
agunah women. Indeed, our encounters underline “the relevance of
first-person accounts . . . to the development of a fuller sense of the
law.” 39 With this methodological posture, we aim to go beyond conventional feminist accounts of the agunah problem40 towards portraits of women moving through secular and religious divorces as
social agents.41
Our own perspective, however, departs from the critical legal
pluralism ethos and methodology as to the role of formal state law
and adjudication. The present field work, as outlined above, borrows
from critical legal pluralism methodology in handing the podium over
to the legal subjects, the agunot women. This is not to say, however,
that the State has lost all relevance to our socio-legal inquiry. State
law retains a paramount role, not as a normative monopoly, but as
a prime influence on legal subjectivity to which bargaining agents
respond. Thus, the emphasis is on what agents do with state law
and how the latter influences their subjectivity and bargaining
possibilities. In this, we are inspired by scholarship in the vein of
37. For an empirical study of norm-generating everyday interactions, see PATRICIA
EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE
(1998). See also Thomas R. Kearns & Austin Sarat, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of
Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21 passim (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993); Sally Engle Merry, Everyday Understandings
of the Law in Working-Class America, 13 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 253 passim (1986); Austin
Sarat, “ . . . The Law is all Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344–45 (1990).
38. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 34, at 38.
39. Angela Campbell, Bountiful Voices, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 183, 191 (2009).
40. See, e.g., Shalev, supra note 8, at 92–93 (describing the discriminatory nature
of Jewish divorce and marriage law); Stopler, supra note 8, at 483–95.
41. On the related topic of Muslim women’s agency, see SUSAN F. HIRSCH,
PRONOUNCING AND PERSEVERING: GENDER AND THE DISCOURSES OF DISPUTING IN AN
AFRICAN ISLAMIC COURT (1998); Anna C. Korteweg, The Sharia Debate in Ontario:
Gender, Islam, and Representations of Muslim Women’s Agency, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y
434, 437–39 (2008).
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left law and economics.42 The present article also draws much inspiration from the law and economics of family life43 to picture the microlevel power relations Israeli women must face.44
Although this article shifts the focus from state law to sovereign
legal subjects, thereby borrowing from critical legal pluralism, the
analysis remains on how state law structures contextual, micropower bargains in light of the indeterminacy of law. This emphasis
on the influence of the State on bargaining positions of legal agents
should not be seen as a step back into “social-scientific” positivity.45
Rather, it brings contextualization of legal subjects’ agency and proper
assessment of their concrete possibilities.46 The analysis allows us
to discuss the effects of both civil and religious laws on legal subjects.
Finally, it should be noted that our empirical work is not intended to bear sufficient objective representativeness and exhaustiveness to be labeled legal anthropology or ethnography. Our goal
is to better illustrate and emphasize how agunot and their husbands play out the Israeli secular/religious divide, through a qualitative “story-telling” approach to socio-legal studies.47 Our encounters
42. For examples, see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract
and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
43. For economic analyses of family life, see FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS
OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK (3d ed. 1998); Lloyd R. Cohen, Marriage: The Long-Term
Contract, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 10 (Antony W. Dnes
& Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002); Robert A. Pollak, Gary Becker’s Contributions to Family
and Household Economics, 1 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 111 (2003). For an analysis of legal
realist-inspired law and economics and its relationship to feminist thought, see PRABHA
KOTISWARAN, DANGEROUS SEX, INVISIBLE LABOR: SEX WORK AND THE LAW IN INDIA
185–211 (2011).
44. Our conception of power and freedom owes much to Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes
of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991).
45. See Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 34, at 35.
46. As put by Duncan Kennedy:
[W]e do not assume that the legal system as a whole deliberately decrees
one thing or another . . . . Rather, we conceptualize the network as providing background rules that constitute the actors, by granting them all
kinds of powers under all kinds of limitations, and then regulating interaction between actors by banning and permitting, encouraging and discouraging particular tactics of particular actors in particular circumstances.
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Economics of U.S. Low Income Housing Markets in Light of
“Informality” Analysis, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 80 (2002).
47. For examples of using a story-telling approach, see Campbell, supra note 33;
Shauna Van Praagh, Faith, Belonging, and the Protection of “Our” Children, 17 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 154 (1999) (interweaving stories with legal argument); Shauna Van
Praagh, The Education of Religious Children: Families, Communities and Constitutions,
47 BUFF. L. REV. 1343 (1999); see also Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 255, 282 (1994) (arguing that storytelling plays an important role in advancing legal
studies by provoking dialogue among groups typically not heard in legal scholarship);
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on
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with agunot women can shed some light on the agency and resistance deployed by religious women navigating law and religion in
diverse contexts.
II. FAILURES OF THE CIVIL LAW
In conducting field work in Israel, we sought to measure the
impacts of secular laws on religious women and their interaction
with religious law. This section presents our findings and evaluates
the existing civil law’s efficiency in empowering and granting women
the equality which is denied to them under religious law.
While core matters, such as the divorce’s actual enactment, are
governed solely by religious law, secularists have been able to bring
forth civil legislation in the key ancillary areas of custody and matrimonial property.48 The 1962 Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law49
deals with child custody and dictates how the decisions should be
made “in the best interest of the [minor],” with both parents enjoying
“equal responsibility” towards their children.50 In 1974, the Spouses
(Property) Relations Law51 came into force and established a retroactive “community property rule” under which each spouse has an
equal share in marital property.52 This set aside the halachic rule
according to which the husband retains total rights over his spouse’s
property.53 As for the jurisdiction over these ancillary matters, section
three of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce)
Law states: “Where a suit for divorce between Jews has been filed in
a rabbinical court, whether by the wife or by the husband, a rabbinical court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in any matter connected
with such suit, including maintenance for the wife and for the children of the couple.” 54
the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 33 n.96 (1990) (“A feminist alternative to this
monologic approach to scholarship would entail conversation and translation, rather
than observation and pronouncement.”).
48. See, e.g., Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 5733-1973, 27 LSI 313 (1972–1973)
(Isr.) (establishing equality in control and division of marital property); Capacity and
Guardianship Law, 572-1962, 16 LSI 106 (1961–1962) (Isr.) (granting both parents equal
rights over their children). But see Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, 57191959, 13 LSI 73, §§ 2(a), 3(a) (1958–1959) (Isr.) (stating that issues of child and spousal
support are still governed by religious law).
49. Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, 16 LSI 106, § 2(17) (1961–1962) (Isr.).
50. RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 249 (2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 573-1973, 27 LSI 313, § 2(5) (1972–1973) (Isr.).
52. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 50, at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. See id. at 252.
54. Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139,
No. 64, § 3 (1952–1953) (Isr.).
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Thus, both civil and religious courts have potential jurisdiction
to decide on any ancillary matters to a divorce, such as custody,
maintenance and division of property. If the file is opened at the
civil court before the actual divorce petition, the relevant ancillary
claims will be heard separately from the main divorce action.55 Civil
courts are often considered to render decisions that are more sympathetic to women than those of rabbinical courts.56 However, as
Daphna Hacker convincingly argues, the ability for women to litigate
before the civil courts is significantly hampered by poor access to justice in the civil realm, compared to less expensive and simpler procedures before the rabbinical courts.57 Bogoch and Halperin-Kaddari
likewise argue that the workings of the civil courts and legislation in
Israel have occulted persisting imbalances and access to justice problems for women.58 Our participants confirmed that litigation before
civil courts represents a heavy financial burden and is often ineffective:
Participant #6:
In the civil court, the property settlement dragged on for eight
years. And in the end it was just thrown out, the whole thing. I’ll
get to that. But [it took] eight years of litigation, thousands and
thousands and thousands of dollars. My parents helped me sometimes, I helped sometimes, I took loans sometimes. I’m still paying
back the loans.

Participant #4:
I opened the file with the civil court and we divided the property.
Not that it has even happened yet, even today the house is still in
limbo; he isn’t moving anything. And that’s it. Everyone went in
their direction and nothing came from this division of property.
It remained as is. Get a lawyer: that costs money. Bring a private
55. Margit Cohn, Women, Religious Law and Religious Courts in Israel—The Jewish
Case, 27 RETFAERD 57, 64 (2004) (“[W]hile divorce proceedings can only be instigated
in the religious court, in other issues there is a choice between the systems. Once one of
the systems is chosen, the issue is ‘captured’ and cannot be decided by its brother-system,
or rival-system.”).
56. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 50, at 233.
57. Daphna Hacker, Religious Tribunals in Democratic States: Lessons from the
Israeli Rabbinical Courts, 27 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2011–2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691671.
58. See Bryna Bogoch & Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Divorce Israeli Style: Professional
Perceptions of Gender and Power in Mediated and Lawyer-Negotiated Divorces, 28 L.
& POL’Y 137, 141 (2006) (“Despite the fact that the family courts provide a more egalitarian forum for women, the power imbalance between men and women . . . was not
remedied by the establishment of the family courts . . . .”).
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investigator: that will take money from you. So I said: “I am not
letting this happen anymore. I did it once and never again.”

Participant #1:
The [civil] family court wanted me to lower [the amount I was
demanding] and they raised a stink. Nothing moved!

Furthermore, it should be noted that some of our participants
did not view the civil courts as inherently favorable to women. They
described how they felt equally miscarried by both religious and
civil courts:
Participant #6:
I can’t even say that it’s only the beit din and that the beit
hamishpat [civil court] was wonderful. I also felt very, very, very
frustrated by the beit hamishpat.

Participant #1:
It was very difficult for me in the rabbinical courts, but also in the
civil courts, which is where I did the division [of property] . . . . Both
courts tortured me quite a bit really. Our system doesn’t have a
clue what is going on!

Our participants also expressed dissatisfaction with the judicial
process before the rabbinical courts, but found that the existing legal
aid services specifically dedicated to litigation in rabbinical courts
greatly helped. Additionally, the possibility of retaining the services
of a rabbinical advocate, an expert of Jewish law who generally commands a lower fee than a regular lawyer but who can only appear
before the rabbinical court, no doubt renders the religious sphere
more attractive than the civil sphere for some women.59
Participant #3:
The rabbinical court put out a warrant to arrest him and then the
police didn’t do anything with it, for more than a year the police
did nothing. They didn’t arrest him and then they decided to close
the case . . . . Only when I was represented by Yad La’Isha [did
things move in the right direction]. First of all, Yad La’Isha immediately spoke to the police and asked that he be arrested. It
59. See SYLVIA MANDELBAUM & MOSHE KOENIG, DIVORCE YOUR LAWYER 13–14 (1985).
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didn’t take a long time, maybe two weeks and then the police all
of a sudden found him and arrested him . . . .

Participant #2:
I went to Yad La’Isha, and there are women there who are
amazing and ready to help. It’s better than any well-known
attorney or lawyer!

A basic cost-benefit analysis may thus direct a woman towards
a rabbinical court instead of a civil court. The claim that civil courts
and legislation systematically make women better off may thus need
to be reexamined.
Another important issue is the enforcement of the financial provisions of the ketubah, the Jewish marriage contract so central to
the marriage celebration.60 The ketubah is often presented as a protection for the wife, as it proclaims that the husband will pay his
wife a sum of money if he divorces her for no good reason or if he
dies.61 According to the literature, the rabbinical court may enforce
the amount stated in the ketubah, while the civil court usually does
not.62 Thus, civil courts may deprive the woman of her ketubah’s
financial advantage in order to replace it with the benefits granted
by civil legislation. Some judicial actors explained to us that rabbinical courts have no integrated approach to the enforcement of the
ketubah and its interaction with other legal rules pertaining to financial matters. This leaves the door open to much strategizing on
the part of women to invoke Jewish law in addition to civil law,
options which were not available to them before the civil courts:
Robyn Shames:
In general . . . division of property is supposed to be according to
civil law, whether it is decided in the civil or rabbinical court. If
60. Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce and Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur,
73 GEO. L.J. 193, 193 & n.2 (1984). The financial provisions contained in the ketubah are
enforceable in Israel but not in Western countries such as the United States. Jonathan
Reiss & Michael J. Broyde, Prenuptial Agreements in Talmudic, Medieval, and Modern
Jewish Thought, in MARRIAGE, SEX, AND FAMILY IN JUDAISM 192, 202–03 (Michael J.
Broyde & Michael Ausubel eds., 2005).
61. Susan Metzger Weiss, Sign at Your Own Risk: The “RCA” Prenuptial May
Prejudice the Fairness of Your Future Divorce Settlement, 6 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 49,
54 (1999). The ketubah includes various provisions such as the husband’s requirements
towards his wife to provide her with adequate food, clothing, shelter and regular
intercourse. LOUIS M. EPSTEIN, THE JEWISH MARRIAGE CONTRACT: A STUDY IN THE
STATUS OF THE WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 54 (2005).
62. See HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 50, at 252.
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the woman received half of the property she does not receive her
ketubah in addition. In practice, it is hard to really say in general
what actually happens in the rabbinical courts as some judges will
only implement Jewish Law on division of property, and here the
ketubah does play a part. In addition, even if the rabbinical court
does decide according to Jewish Law, it depends on the circumstances if they give the woman her ketubah (they won’t if she is
unfaithful) or even part of it (they sometimes decide that the
amount written is exaggerated).63

The secular/religious divide and the dual jurisdiction thus create
a prism through which elements of Jewish law and civil law travel
from one court to the other, deformed and adapted by the judges according to ideology and by the parties according to their own strategic needs.64 Interestingly, only Participant #3 knew what a ketubah
contained. The other women dismissed it as a mere ritual or as an unenforceable religious artifact. Is the emancipatory power and beauty
of the civil legislation marginalizing the ketubah document and depriving women of advantageous strategic avenues?
One thing is apparent: the intersection of religious and secular
law allows the husband to impose conditions on the divorce. The get
is thus sometimes used as an extortion tool for economic gains, to the
detriment of the wife, in order to pay less alimony or child support.65
If a Jewish woman cannot grant the get on her own initiative,66 she
may refuse her husband’s get, which will prevent rabbinical authorities from dissolving the marriage contract.67 Jewish women may
refuse consent to the get for reasons related to the best interests of
their children, to extract further concessions from the husband or
for pecuniary incentives.68 However, this bargaining tool is of limited
63. E-mail from Robyn Shames, Dir., Int’l Coal. for Agunah Rights (Mar. 8, 2011) (on
file with author).
64. This finding echoes Professor Fournier’s research on mahr, the Islamic dower, and
its treatment by Western courts, which presented radically diverging treatment of this
religious institution depending on the context and the philosophical inclinations of the
judge adjudicating a given dispute. One of the implications is that religious institutions
can have many diverging effects for women’s empowerment and that they cannot be reduced to systematic punishing forces. See Pascale Fournier, Flirting with God in Western
Secular Courts: Mahr in the West, 24 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 67, 67 (2010); Pascale
Fournier, In the (Canadian) Shadow of Islamic Law: Translating Mahr as a Bargaining
Endowment, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 649, 675–76 (2006).
65. Bogoch & Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 58, at 140.
66. It is “regarded as against . . . the spirit of the [Jewish] law” for a wife to be able
to dismiss her husband by granting him the get. M. MIELZINER, THE JEWISH LAW OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES, AND ITS RELATION TO THE LAW
OF THE STATE 118 (1987).
67. Bogoch & Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 58, at 140.
68. Although little evidence exists with regard to the frequency at which this bargaining power is used by women, a study issued by the Chief Rabbinate of the State of
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use to women since husbands can, in practice, remarry without the
get.69 Inversely, if a Jewish man refuses to grant the get, the wife is
left with very little religious recourse.70 Hence, “the opportunit[y]
for strategic behavior in civil divorce proceedings” 71 is remarkable,
making the get an ideal tool for blackmail.72 Lisa Fishbayn writes that
“[t]he power men enjoy under Jewish law to withhold a get is of concern to civil law because this power becomes an effective bargaining
endowment in the resolution of civil family law disputes.” 73 It is estimated that close to 100,000 divorced women in Israel were victims
of get extortion during their divorce process.74
Susan Weiss, the director of the Women’s Center for Justice in
Jerusalem, wrote about a woman whose parents paid their son-in-law
$100,000 for a get.75 Rabbinical court advocate Rivkah Lubitch wrote
about a woman whose husband would agree to divorce her only if
she dropped all of her civil court files (maintenance and property
Israel reports that within divorce proceedings commenced from 2005 to 2007, “some 180
women [were] ‘chained’ to their husbands, while a slightly higher amount of men [were]
‘chained’ to their wives.” Hillel Fendel, Rabbinate Stats: 180 Women, 185 Men ‘Chained’
by Spouses, ISR. NAT ’L NEWS (Aug. 23, 2007, 2:10 PM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com
/News/News.aspx/123472. In nearly 350 divorce cases that were active as of 2005, 19% of
the cases continue to be unresolved because of the man’s refusal to grant a get, while 20%
of the cases showed that women failed to cooperate with the divorce proceedings. Id.
Among the reasons cited for this “divorce blackmail” were the negotiation of custody
agreements and spousal support. Id.
69. Bogoch & Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 58, at 140.
70. Id.
71. Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 464 (2009).
72. Joel Nichols notes several examples from the United States:
[O]ne recalcitrant husband agreed to issue a get only after receiving $15,000
and a promise that his former wife would not press assault charges against
him after he broke her leg. Other examples include a woman who mortgaged her house for $120,000 to pay the amount demanded by her husband
for issuance of a get, a woman who was forced to drop charges against her
husband for sexually abusing their daughter so that she might obtain a get,
and the increasing demands of a recalcitrant husband who asked for
$100,000 (which he received), then $1 million, and then his wife’s father’s
pension—in addition to demanding full custody of the children.
Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and
Louisiana to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 135, 158 (2007)
(footnotes omitted); see also David M. Cobin, Jewish Divorce and the Recalcitrant
Husband—Refusal to Give a Get as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 4 J.L.
& RELIGION 405, 415–16, 418–21 (1986) (providing an example of a husband withholding
the get to extort concessions from his wife).
73. Lisa Fishbayn, Gender, Multiculturalism and Dialogue: The Case of Jewish
Divorce, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 71, 85 (2008).
74. LERNER, supra note 18, at 213 n.12; Karin Carmit Yefet, Comment, Unchaining the
Agunot: Enlisting the Israeli Constitution in the Service of Women’s Marital Freedom, 20
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 441, 447 (2009).
75. The Problem and Our Solutions, CENTER FOR WOMEN’S JUST., available at http://
www.cwj.org.il/the-problem-and-our-solutions (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
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division).76 In one case reported by Yefet, a man refused to give his
wife a get unless she paid him the money she received as war reparations for being a Holocaust survivor, a demand of high symbolic
value in Israel.77 Men “can also validly condition their consent upon
non-monetary criteria, even restraining their wives’ most basic and
private affairs by controlling, for example, what they can eat or
wear.”78 Our interview participants also reported having to renounce
civil entitlements such as alimony, matrimonial property, and even
the custody of their children in order to negotiate the granting of a
religious divorce:
Participant #1:
[A]fter some time he told the children “Look, okay, I want to give
your mother a get but the condition is that I keep my assets.” So
I relinquished my rights in his businesses.

Participant #3:
It was very difficult at the rabbinate, every few years he [the
husband] would ask, demand all kinds of things . . . . He had all
kinds of claims: “I want the child, I want the boy to go to school
here.” They always delayed the hearing because of one claim or
another unjustified reasons [sic] and it went on for years, for
years! . . . He said that [he would give the get] if I agreed to this
and that, and it was something different all the time.

This possibility of blackmailing and extortion across the religious/
secular divide makes for bargaining strategies on the part of the
spouses that circumvent the civil custody and property entitlements
of the other. While in some situations it undeniably favors the women,
in others the civil law can be detrimental or useless to Jewish Israeli
women. Thus, while the availability of civil regimes of divorce should
be supported, the tales of our Jewish women participants indicate
that critical attention to the concrete impacts of civil and religious law
needs to be maintained. They also belie the assumption that halacha
is autonomous and wholly separate from civil law. Rather, they expose both spheres as intertwined in the battlefield where husband
and wife play out their antagonisms in the shadowy areas between
76. Rivkah Lubitch, Find the Husband, Y NET NEWS JEWISH WORLD (June 13, 2010,
4:16 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3903363,00.html.
77. Yefet, supra note 74, at 447.
78. Id. (footnote omitted).
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religious and secular law.79 Would this situation be any different
under a (hypothetical) totally secularized system? The importance
of the agunah problem in Western secular states such as Canada80
and the United States seems to indicate that the secular/religious
entanglement which produces the agunah problem would not disappear merely because of official state disavowal.81 Religion may well
be here to stay.
III. RELIGIOUS EMPOWERMENT: SANCTIONS AND THEIR LIMITS
This section presents a portrait of the religious sphere of family
law and Israeli women’s navigation through the contradictory forces
which shape the patriarchal structures that they inhabit. It starts by
presenting “the classical Jewish law of divorce, general rules which
are followed with more or less rigidity by various denomination [sic]
of Judaism.” 82 The authority to divorce in Jewish law is found in the
Torah at verse 24:1 in the book of Deuteronomy which states that:
When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it cometh to
pass, if she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some
unseemly thing in her, that he writeth her a bill of divorcement,
and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house.83

This passage was interpreted as bestowing the exclusive privilege
to divorce on the husband.84 Moreover, the words “if she find no favor
79. Furthermore, as reported by Dov Frimer, the entitlement to a get under Jewish
law may influence the availability of maintenance under civil law. Dov Frimer, Israel
Civil Courts and Rabbinical Courts Under One Roof, 24 ISR. L. REV. 553, 558 (1990).
80. On the importance of the agunah problem in Canadian society, see the Supreme
Court of Canada judgement of Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.). See also
Pascale Fournier, Halacha, the ‘Jewish State’ and the Canadian Agunah: Comparative
Law at the Intersection of Religious and Secular Orders, J. LEGAL PLURALISM 5 (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Fournier, Halacha, the ‘Jewish State’ and the Canadian
Agunah]. On the importance of Islamic law in secular Western legal systems, see
Pascale Fournier, Borders and Crossroads: Comparative Perspectives on Minorities and
Conflicts of Laws, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 987 (2011).
81. See Fournier, Halacha, the ‘Jewish State’ and the Canadian Agunah, supra
note 80, at 19–20.
82. Id. at 4. For a competing interpretation of the agunah problem, see Rachel Sara
Rosenthal, Of Pearls and Fish: An Analysis of Jewish Legal Texts on Sexuality and
Their Significance for Contemporary American Jewish Movements, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 485, 520–23 (2006).
83. Deuteronomy 24:1; see also Rosenthal, supra note 82, at 517 (explaining that,
based on the language of the man “tak[ing]” the wife, “rabbis interpret that action to
mean that only a man can affect the kiddushin at the beginning of the marriage”).
84. Yehiel S. Kaplan, Enforcement of Divorce Judgments by Imprisonment: Principles
of Jewish Law, in 15 JEWISH L. ANN. 57, 61 (2004).
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in his eyes” were interpreted by medieval rabbinical scholars to imply that a divorce must be offered out of the complete free will of the
husband.85 This requirement was repeated throughout the centuries
by religious scholars and has become an undefeatable condition for
a valid divorce.86
Jewish divorces are “executed by the granting of a writ of divorce (called a Get), on behalf of the man to the woman.” 87 For gets
to be valid, a rabbinical court (beth din, pl. batei din) “must oversee
the divorce process.” 88 The beth din is unable to enact the divorce
independent of the man’s consent, which is “the sine qua non of the
entire process.” 89 A wife, on the other hand, may refuse her husband’s
get, but her bargaining power is severely hampered by a set of rules
relating to her marriage status which essentially do not apply to
men.90 For instance, should a woman enter into a relationship before
having obtained a get from her husband, she would be considered
“a rebellious wife” and receive none of the sum agreed upon in her
ketubah.91 In that case, even after a potential Jewish divorce, she
will not be allowed to marry her partner under Jewish law or remarry her ex-husband.92 Any children she may bear with her new partner
would be considered a mamzer (pl. mamzerim, bastard children) and
be “effectively excluded from organized Judaism.” 93 The mamzer status
continues on for generations down the line and mamzerim are only
permitted to marry each other.94
85. Id. at 61 & n.11; accord Yifat Bitton, Public Hierarchy and Private Harm: Tort
Law as a Remedy for Gender Inequality in Israeli Family Law, in (RE)INTERPRETATIONS:
THE SHAPES OF JUSTICE IN WOMEN’S EXPERIENCE 115, 117–18 (Lisa Dresdner & Laurel
S. Peterson eds., 2009) (“As women wait passively for their husbands to issue them the
get, and release them from being both their symbolic and actual captives, women
sustain immeasurable harm to their social and economic status, feelings, dignity, and
much more, by being unable to free themselves from their marital status and its
entailed confinements.”).
86. Bitton, supra note 85, at 126–27.
87. See Fournier, Halacha, the ‘Jewish State’ and the Canadian Agunah, supra
note 80, at 4.
88. Id. The rabbinical court is composed of three Jewish judges (dayanim). Id.
89. Michael S. Berger & Deborah E. Lipstadt, Women in Judaism from the Perspective
of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN JUDAISM: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 77, 99 (Michael J. Broyde & John Witte Jr. eds., 1998).
90. See id. at 100.
91. Cohn, supra note 55, at 68.
92. Id.
93. Nichols, supra note 72, at 155.
94. See Cohn, supra note 55, at 68 (“Any children with her lover, conceived while
married to another, would be considered ‘mamzerin’—a pariah status that entails
exclusion from the proper Jewish community, and leaves such second-rate people the
right to only marry between themselves and remain pariahs for ten generations.”); see
also John D. Rayner, The Gender Issue in Jewish Divorce, in GENDER ISSUES IN JEWISH
LAW: ESSAYS AND RESPONSA 33, 43 (Walter Jacob & Moshe Zemer eds., 2001).
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Men, on the other hand, are not subject to these consequences.95
Indeed, a man’s marriage with another woman in the absence of a get
is halachically valid and that man’s children are legitimate.96 He is
not considered to have committed adultery, but merely to have contravened a rabbinical decree prescribing monogamy.97 He can marry
his adulterous lover, have legitimate children with her, and even
receive a permit from an Israeli rabbinical court to remarry if his
wife refuses to accept the get.98
Whether it is the husband who is withholding the get or the
woman who is refusing it, the rabbinical court can only order the
parties to divorce on very specific halachic grounds and may not
enact the divorce itself.99 If there are no grounds for divorce, there is
nothing short of an agreement of the spouses that can dissolve the
marriage.100 Oftentimes, if the wife is subject to physical or verbal
abuse by her husband or if the husband is impotent, sterile, or fails to
provide maintenance, a divorce order may be granted.101 Inversely,
the husband can claim the compulsion of get acceptance by a rabbinical court if he proves that he has reasons to suspect his wife of being
adulterous or if she leads him to transgress Jewish law.102 Although
the rabbinical court judges do not often issue orders to compel or
obligate the giving of the get, when they do, the 1995 Sanctions Law
allows them to issue sanctions and a variety of restrictive orders
upon a recalcitrant spouse.103 The power of the community to use indirect pressure to influence a husband to issue a bill of divorce, which
in the past was done through ostracism and excommunication,104 is
now said to be translated into legislation by allowing the courts to
withhold certain benefits of the husband.105 For instance, the law allows for the imposition of restrictions on the right to leave the country,
95. Nichols, supra note 72, at 155.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Yefet, supra note 74, at 447 & n.28 (citing a Supreme Court of Israel decision
“where the rabbinical court granted a remarriage permit to a husband over his wife’s
objection, that the rabbinical court enjoy[ed] a broad discretion to grant permits and
that it [could] do so in order to compel a wife to accept the get”).
99. See id. at 442–43 (“The judicial act of divorce is not constitutive, but merely
declarative—the rabbinical court can merely declare that the husband must divorce his
wife, and in limited instances, can apply coercive measures in hopes of persuading the
husband to grant the divorce.”).
100. David L. Lieber et al., Divorce, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 712 (Fred Skolnik &
Michael Berenbaum eds., 2d ed. 2007).
101. Id. at 712–13.
102. Id.; see Irwin H. Haut, Divorce in Jewish Law and Life, in 5 STUDIES IN JEWISH
JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1983) (describing the schools of thought on the grounds for divorce).
103. Lieber et al., supra note 100, at 718.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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obtain an Israeli passport, maintain a driver’s license, work in a profession regulated by law or operate a business requiring a license or
legal permit, open or maintain a bank account, etc.106 Section 3 of the
Sanctions Law even allows for imprisonment to compel compliance
with a divorce order.107 The period of imprisonment that a rabbinical
court may impose is limited to five years, a term that may be extended
by the court as long as the total term does not exceed ten years.108
Another section of the Sanctions Law goes as far as to allow the
rabbinical court to impose certain sanctions upon a husband who
may already be serving a jail sentence.109
The Israeli rabbinical courts ordered the issuing of sanctions
seventy-three times in 2008; twenty arrest warrants were issued,
and private investigators were hired by the courts thirty-six times
to locate men who had disappeared in Israel or abroad to avoid giving their wives a get.110 Further statistics show that the Sanctions
Law was used several times in 2006,111 and between 1995 and 1998,
106 legal procedures resulted in forty-three divorces.112 Professor
Einhorn argued that the Sanctions Law “has encouraged Jewish
spouses domiciled also in foreign countries to apply for a Jewish divorce in the Israeli rabbinical courts.” 113 On its face, the response of
the Israeli State thus seems to bring at least some solution to the
plight of the agunah. Most of our participants confirmed that indeed
the Sanctions Law brought some empowerment to them. They had
had recourse to several of the sanctions available under the Sanctions
Law and found that some were ineffective, but through trial and
error they found remedies that had the desired effect and successfully disciplined their husbands.
Participant #2:
At the beginning I asked for alimony. . . . We sued him and the
National Insurance Institute paid because of course he has no
money and it didn’t bother him because he wasn’t paying. And
106. Kaplan, supra note 84, at 123.
107. Sanctions Law, supra note 24, § 3.
108. Id. § 3(b).
109. Id. § 2(7).
110. ADMINISTRATION OF THE RABBINICAL COURTS: YEARLY SUMMARY 2008 (Hebrew),
http://www.rbc.gov.il/statistics/2008/2008.pdf.
111. See Nissan Ratzlav-Katz, Statistics Dispel Claims of ‘Thousands of Israeli Agunot,’
ISR. NAT’L NEWS (June 27, 2007, 1:45 AM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News
.aspx/122884 (reporting that the court used sanctions in 41 cases).
112. Gail Lichtman, No Exit: Jerusalem Organizations Are Working to Ease the Plight
of “Agunot,” Women Denied Divorce, JERUSALEM MAG. (Jan. 2000), available at http://www
.israelect.com/Come-and-Hear/editor/agunot/legalaid/index.html.
113. TALIA EINHORN, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ISRAEL 214 (2009).
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then he still didn’t want to [give the get]. Afterwards, we applied
for an exit delay from the country, but he doesn’t have the money
to drive into town, so what do you think he is going to do abroad?
So that neither [worked]. Afterwards I realized what would really
shake him up would be his driver’s license. He has a handicap,
because of the alcohol: it damaged his leg. It led to necrosis in
his hip bone. . . . And after he had a very difficult surgery and it
was hard for him to walk, so he needed a car, so I told my rabbinical advocate: “I think that we should ask to take his driver’s
license.” She was skeptical, and I told her: “No, I know him.” . . .
We sent in a request for sanctions and they actually took his license and then he started going wild. He appealed to the high
rabbinical court in Jerusalem and we went. And there the rabbis
were even more determined, like “No, you won’t get your license
back until you give her a get, you are obligated to give her a get!”

Participant #5:
They took away his passport. But between me and you, if he wants
to leave the country through Sinai, he’s going to be able to leave,
okay, and that’s not a secret. So they took away his driver’s license,
and that’s something he’s fighting about now. He wants back his
driver’s license!

Participant #3:
He was in prison for four months, and every time they brought
him from prison to the rabbinical court he said “No, I’m not ready,
you can arrest me forever.” . . . So they brought him back to
prison again and then back to court again and again and again.
He thought “that’s the way it is,” and the last time they said “okay,
we won’t give you any date for court, you’ll remain arrested until
you say ‘I want’ [to give the get]” and it didn’t take a long time
(laughter). . . . [He agreed to give the get] because he had no
choice, because if he didn’t agree he would have continued sitting in prison. And then one day they brought him and they convinced him and he gave the get through much suffering. You could
really see that the man was suffering, but at the end he gave it because he understood that he would stay in prison.

The Sanctions Law thus left some room for empowerment for
those women who were able to play out the Israeli legal system to
their advantage. Furthermore, the women we interviewed gave us
some fascinating insights into the personal empowerment they experienced while sanctioning their husbands. The get refusal and the
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disciplinary practices actually allowed some women to gain an autonomy they could not otherwise have enjoyed.
Participant #3:
When he was in jail [for get refusal] he was constantly contacting
me by phone. . . . It went on for months and he kept on harassing
me on the phone and begged and begged but I knew that it was
in vain because there was no way that I would give in until I
achieved what I wanted to achieve.

Participant #6:
The empowerment, the process of empowerment that I went
through, from when I was emotionally abused and tolerating
that, to taking responsibility for my life and leaving him . . . opening up my own post office box and changing my bank account.
All these little teeny things which were necessary, gave me the
belief that somebody’s helping me, that God wanted me to do
this. If I hadn’t been divorced, I’d still be living in that neighborhood and I would not be the same person. . . . I am absolutely a
new person, absolutely a new person. I still have scars inside, I
still have bandages. I was abused and there are still scars, but
most of the time I can cover them up and I feel empowered. And
I will not let anybody step on me ever again.

Our participants thus indicated that some forms of empowerment resulted from the welcoming and disciplinary power of the religious sphere. The Sanctions Law remains, however, deeply flawed.
For one, the rabbinical courts have been very reluctant to issue orders compelling divorce.114 Only a small number of these compulsion
decrees are issued each year.115 Furthermore, “[e]ven when men are
commanded to divorce, the court seldom applies the coercive measures
that it was legislatively authorized to use in 1995.” 116 As a result, the
Sanctions Law is quite often unenforced.117 For our participants, the
114. Lichtman, supra note 112 (“We have used sanctions, including jail, in more than
200 cases since 1995.”).
115. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat & Benjamin Shmueli, The Interplay Between Tort Law and
Religious Family Law: The Israeli Case, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 279, 282 (2009).
116. Yefet, supra note 74, at 448 (footnote omitted).
117. See, e.g., Jessica Davidson Miller, The History of the Agunah in America: A Clash
of Religious Law and Social Progress, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 14 (1997) (“[W]omen’s
groups still complain that the problem of the agunah is not treated with sufficient
gravity.”); Erica R. Clinton, Note, Chains of Marriage: Israeli Women’s Fight for Freedom,
3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283, 306 (1999) (“The Knesset . . . enacted a statute that allows
the rabbinical courts to give the divorce case to the civil courts who can then imprison the
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unenforceability of the sanctions stemmed from judicial actors and
the police in charge of executing the ordinances rendered under the
Sanctions Law:
Participant #3:
It is a very difficult process, a very difficult process. . . . Every
time, it was prolonged for another reason. It went on and they
threatened him with arrest and he said “Please go ahead and
arrest me.” Then the rabbinical court put out a warrant to arrest
him and the police didn’t do anything with it. For more than a
year the police did nothing, they didn’t arrest him and then the
rabbinical court decided to close the case.

Participant #6:
[We got] the chiyuv get and once we got that, the toen rabbani
[rabbinical advocate] said “okay, now it’s just a matter of time.”
And then they said something like “if he doesn’t give you a get in
30 days, he’ll be arrested.” Now, they had already put out a court
order that he had to come at one o’clock, because since he had
skipped some of these hearings. . . . What happened? The police
went and looked for him, he wasn’t there. I told them to look at
his sister’s house, I told them to look at his brother’s house, everywhere they went to look, he wasn’t there. He ended up showing up
anyways. What did I learn from that? I can’t count on the police
that they’re going to find him. Court order, shmourt order! . . .
I can sit at home and hold this nice piece of paper and have it
framed on the wall, and he’s going to still do whatever he wants.

The unenforceability of the sanctions were also said to stem from
the rabbis themselves. In fact, the participants indicated that hearings at the rabbinical courts were delayed because the rabbis were
reticent and unsympathetic to the women’s plight:
Participant #4:
Q: Were there other sanctions against him other than putting
him in prison?
A: We started all of them but they [the rabbis] actually didn’t
want to do them [the sanctions]. You see, I learned the rabbinical
court’s ways. . . . They start something but they don’t follow it all
husband until he agrees to the get. . . . The rabbinical courts have refused, however, to
utilize this resource.” (footnotes omitted)).
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the way through to the end. It’s like they feel . . . it’s not comfortable for them to hurt people. . . . It was a waste of time, they
applied sanctions, they brought notes to his synagogue so that
he won’t be [allowed to be] a cantor, but they didn’t hang them;
they told me to hang them. Why should I go into a men’s synagogue and hang the notes? The men from the synagogue would
kill me! What is this logic?

Participant #5:
I don’t think that the rabbis do their job the way they should.
We go into a hearing and we’re invited for 10:30, and we go in at
like 12:30 and at one o’clock, when they have to go home, they
put on their coat and their hat and they say “okay, we’ve heard
enough and we’ll send you a decision in the mail.” . . . The rabbis
wait a long time until they actually go ahead and give you an
arrest warrant.

These testimonies echo the view of scholars for whom the rabbinical courts’ reluctance to issue orders compelling divorce stems
from the fear that applying sanctions upon the recalcitrant husband
will render the eventual giving of the get invalid due to force or undue
pressure.118 Rabbis are said to be very careful when dealing with the
breakdown of a marriage, because a get that is given forcibly, or because a man felt pressured to do so, will be rendered invalid (a “get
meuseh”).119 Robyn Shames also explained that rabbis would encourage women to settle, by saying to the women “pay him what he wants,
you see what type of person he is, just pay him what he wants.” 120
She also described the conception of rabbis she encountered; for
them, women will only hurt themselves by refusing the conditions
men put forth in order to grant them a get, sometimes becoming
“get refusers” in the eyes of the court.121 A rabbi’s ideological and
personal inclinations may thus influence the adjudicative process.
118. See, e.g., Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 115, at 283 (“[T]he sum must not
be too large or else it will be considered a fine that renders the get void.”); see also Talia
Einhorn, Jewish Divorce in the International Arena, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 135, 151 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2000); Pinhas Shifman,
The Status of Women in Israeli Family Law—The Case for Reform, in DEVELOPMENTS
IN AUSTRIAN AND ISRAELI PRIVATE LAW 245, 245 (Herbert Hausmaninger et al. eds., 1999).
119. Bitton, supra note 85, at 117–18; Kaplan, supra note 84, at 61; Yefet, supra
note 74, at 446 (“If forced, the get is invalid, and grave consequences ensue for a woman
and her children born after the invalid get was obtained.” (footnotes omitted)).
120. Interview with Robyn Shames, Dir., Int’l Coal. for Agunah Rights (Mar. 16, 2011).
121. Id.; see also Blecher-Prigat & Shmueli, supra note 115, at 283 (“[I]f the husband
agrees to give the wife a get with conditions, . . . no justification exists to apply decrees
against him in the eyes of the religious courts. If the wife refuses to accept the conditions
set by her husband, it is she who prevents the realization of the get.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Accordingly, the religious composition of Israeli courts was always
the object of much academic interest. Scholars have described the
“monopoly” Orthodox groups enjoy over family law in Israel.122
Moreover, Orthodox rabbis are considered to form the majority of
rabbinical court judges in the country123 and are said to be partial to
the arguments of the husband.124 Some participants have indicated
that the verdicts issued by the rabbinical courts are inconsistent and
depend on the backgrounds, personalities and religious ideologies
of the judges.
Participant #1:
I don’t know what their [the rabbinical courts’] process is. I just
don’t understand it and I was always mad at them until the
end. . . . It was very hard because they did not see the importance of it [getting the get].

Participant #2:
I would talk and the rabbis would ignore me. They would only
use his arguments and what he said; they only care about what
the man wants not what the woman wants. They treated me like
I wasn’t even there. Then I said: “I came to ask to be free, not for
money or anything, just to be free.” . . . When the rabbis saw
that I have a rabbinical advocate and that I am determined, that
I want [a divorce] and that I am doing everything to get it, then
they were easier.

Joanne Zack-Pakes125:
Once in a while we will get a rabbinical court that has guts, that
will put the pressure on the guy. But it is unpredictable, there’s
nothing uniform in the decision making. It’s all based on whim
122. Frances Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality: The Israeli Case, 25
ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 193, 214 (1996). On the importance of Orthodox Judaism with
regards to other religious denominations in Israel, see ASHER COHEN & BERNARD
SUSSER, ISRAEL AND THE POLITICS OF JEWISH IDENTITY: THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS
IMPASSE 121–22 (2000).
123. PATRICIA J. WOODS, JUDICIAL POWER AND NATIONAL POLITICS: COURTS AND GENDER
IN THE RELIGIOUS-SECULAR CONFLICT IN ISRAEL xvi (2008); see also Ruth Halperin-Kaddari,
Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
339, 348 (2000) (describing Israel’s rabbinical courts as “exclusively Orthodox”).
124. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 50, at 233; see also Clinton, supra note 117,
at 307 (“The rabbinical courts have tried to appear concerned for the women that come
before their tribunal, yet they are unwilling to enact any real solution to the problem
of the agunah.”).
125. Social worker at the Mavoi Satum organization.
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and which three judges are sitting and half the time there aren’t
even three judges there so they can’t make a decision. They show
up late for work, they leave early from work. . . . There is nothing uniform about the rabbinical courts, one rabbi is rigid, one
is not rigid.

As a result of this phenomenon, lawyers and rabbinical advocates
will strategize to bring their clients in front of judges who they deem
more lenient. Participants had often wanted a particular rabbi to adjudicate their divorce petition because of these perceived ideological,
religious or personal inclinations.
Participant #1:
We needed to go to the high rabbinical court. And only there was
I saved, because we had there Rabbi Lazare126 who worked with
my boss, and he came to a lot of the hearings. I called him many
times and asked him to help.

Participant #6:
Everybody knew, even I knew that I needed to be in [Rabbi] Rav
Feldman’s127 group, the panel with the three of them. . . . Now
in the beit hadin hagadol [high rabbinical court], there was only
one dayan, one of those rabbis who would understand. . . . So we
knew that we needed to get to Rav Shmuel Feldman.128

Participant #4:
I have to say, in the rabbinical court it didn’t go through at
first. . . . He sued me at the high rabbinical court, because he
was against this rabbinical court here. He came to Jerusalem,
in front of Rabbi Nissan129 and two others. So then I arrived with
my lawyer and his lawyer came alone. He says to him: “Where
is your client?” He says, “he couldn’t make it,” so he says “okay,
so tell him you have to give a get and we’ll be done with this
story.” . . . And I said “Wow we reached these guys! Wow! This
is going to be something! Like finally something in my favor,
they really went in my favor!”

Even though participants did experience frustration at the leniency manifested by the rabbinical court towards their husbands,
126.
127.
128.
129.

Fictitious name.
Fictitious name.
Fictitious name.
Fictitious name.
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the existence of a legal right to sanctions and the community-based
nature of the rabbinical courts allowed some of them to personally
put pressure on the rabbis:
Participant #1:
I am even crying now, it was a really sad process, because every
Monday and Thursday I would go to the rabbinical court. . . . He
would not come and they would treat him with forgiveness.
Because of my connections I was able to get the cell number of
the rabbinical court judge and every time I would nag him, call
him. I told him: “What do you want me to do? You tell me not to
sin, how can I not sin?”

Likewise, and notwithstanding widespread complaints that rabbis are overly sympathetic to men, some participants were able to
play out their image against that of their husband’s to successfully
influence the rabbis. According to Halperin-Kaddari, the religious
courts, when rendering decisions, will put more emphasis on moral
and religious questions than do the civil courts.130 Their application
of the law and appreciation of the facts may be tainted by their religious perspective.131 For instance, Ariel Rosen-Zvi indicates that the
rabbinical court will likely favor the “more religious” parent for custody
purposes.132 Exploiting the perception that the rabbis had of their personal ethics and situation could constitute a fertile strategic avenue
for many religious women, as some of our participants demonstrated:
Participant #6:
Watching him in action yelling at the judges, . . . that was what
convinced them that I needed a get. . . . I mean also, I’m this
together lady, and when they saw him ranting and raving they
didn’t like him. . . . So then, at one point, towards the end, we
finally got a chiyuv [order that the get be given].

Participant #2:
Three rabbis were sitting at the beit din, and I said “When you
go to sleep, think that I am your daughter. Would you relate to
your daughter like you are acting to me?” I don’t know if it did
130. See HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 50, at 250 (“Rabbinical courts do not abide by
the law’s directives if these conflict with the courts’ religious convictions.”).
131. See id. at 227.
132. Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Forum Shopping Between Religious and Secular Courts (and
Its Impact on the Legal System), 9 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 347, 352 (1989).
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anything to them but the next time, they changed, they decided
they had to give me a get. They treated me like a human.

Thus, the major flaw of the Sanctions Law is its indeterminacy
and its permeability to ideological manipulation.133 However, as we
have seen, in some cases this phenomenon can be exploited by the
women to manipulate religious law in their favor. Finally, we leave
the last word to our participants, which indicated that despite the
inequalities and defects of religious law, the latter was an indispensable ingredient to any solution to the agunah problem which
cannot be ignored:
Participant #4:
I am a woman who believes, and I believe that these rabbinical
judges have a job to do in this world. They have a job and it isn’t
an easy one. . . . I believe in the Torah of Moses, I believe that if
it came down that way then it needs to stay that way and not to
change it every Monday and Thursday, . . . but they [the rabbis]
should make some better decisions.

Participant #5:
I mean most of the secular world doesn’t even care about the get:
“Get or no get, I’ll do whatever I want.” That’s something that I
can’t do. I mean, I’ll be kicked out of my community in no time.

Participant #6:
I think that there’s ways to implement the halacha that aren’t
being done. We don’t have to throw away our halacha! There are
problems with the halacha, I had terrible issues with that. But
what kept me going was that I’m trying to not throw away the
halacha. . . . The problem is the way people use halacha!

CONCLUSION
Far from representing victims in need of saving, Israeli religious
women deploy power, agency and resistance on a daily basis, subverting existing disciplinary mechanisms. Unexpectedly, both the secular
and the religious spheres show a potential to produce differentiated
133. This is not to suggest, of course, that religious law is indeterminate whereas
secular law is not. For the application of the indeterminacy thesis in Western systems,
see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) 4 (1997). See also
Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339, 341–45
(1996) (explaining the indeterminancy thesis).
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bargaining endowments.134 Furthermore, despite its numerous flaws
and shortcomings, the very existence of the (religious) Sanctions Law
seems to indicate that Israeli women have attained some form of
long-fought-for empowerment.135 Our field work on the workings of
this law in fact supports Susan Weiss’s view that “[h]alakhah is not
a collection of harsh and uniform rules, but rather embraces various
and contradictory voices [and that t]he outcome of a given legal case
depends upon the rabbinical authority consulted, the ‘facts’ he deems
worthy of emphasis, and the voices he chooses to heed.” 136
Indeed, Jewish law does not seem to be a homogeneous body of
oppressive rules but an open-ended toolbox which is used in various
contradictory ways by different rabbis. The growing mass of feminist Jewish scholarship137 is interesting in this regard, contradicting
as it does the claim that equality is at odds with the tenets of Jewish
faith.138 It also indicates that our interview participants were right to
take on their rabbis in the hope of tilting their adjudication in their
favor. Moreover, what we gather from the experiences of the women
interviewed is that the introduction of civil jurisdiction over certain
134. For thorough exploration of this idea in the Canadian context, see Pascale
Fournier, Calculating Claims: Jewish and Muslim Women Navigating Religion,
Economics and Law in Canada, 8 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT (forthcoming 2012).
135. See, e.g., HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 50, at 238 (describing the 1995 Sanctions
Law as “[a] major step forward with regard to the agunah problem”).
136. Susan Weiss, Israeli Divorce Law: The Maldistribution of Power, its Abuses, and
the “Status” of Jewish Women, in MEN AND WOMEN: GENDER, JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY
53, 63 (Rachel Elior ed., 2004). For a similar argument, see Philippa Strum, Women and
the Politics of Religion in Israel, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 483, 496 (1989) (“The problem is not
halacha, . . . but who interprets it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137. See, e.g., NAOMI GRAETZ, UNLOCKING THE GARDEN: A FEMINIST JEWISH LOOK AT
THE BIBLE, MIDRASH AND GOD 4 (2005) (“[S]ince feminism is inseparable from our religious
orientation and is viewed as part of our concepts of spirituality and holiness, its teachings
must be integrated. We bring to the texts questions from our time and seek to uncover
meanings . . . that relate to these questions.”); TAMAR ROSS, EXPANDING THE PALACE OF
TORAH: ORTHODOXY AND FEMINISM xvi–xvii (2004) (“[F]eminism need not be seen as a
threat to traditional Judaism . . . .”); Esther Fuchs, Jewish Feminist Scholarship: A
Critical Perspective, in 14 STUDIES IN JEWISH CIVILIZATION 225, 225 (Leonard J.
Greenspoon et al. eds., 2003) (describing feminist Jewish scholarship as being “a new
field of study”); Judith Hauptman, Feminist Perspectives on Rabbinic Texts, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON JEWISH STUDIES 40, 43 (Lynn Davidman & Shelly Tenenbaum eds.,
1994) (“[T]here has been an explosion in the number of recently published popular
works on feminism and Judaism.”); Norma Baumel Joseph, Jewish Law and Gender,
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN AND RELIGION IN NORTH AMERICA 576, 588 (Rosemary
Skinner Keller & Rosemary Radford Ruether eds., 2005) (“Since the legal system was
established as a responsive one, much of [Jewish law’s] content can be addressed in
today’s language and terms, using women’s experience to pry it open.”); see also LAURA
LEVITT, JEWS AND FEMINISM: THE AMBIVALENT SEARCH FOR HOME 128 (1997); ISAAC
SASSOON, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN JEWISH TRADITION (2011).
138. This echoes Professor Fournier’s findings with regard to Canadian Jewish and
Muslim women. See Fournier, supra note 134, at 18.
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matters does not systematically amount to empowerment of women.
As we have seen, civil courts may be less accessible than religious
courts, may deprive the woman of her ketubah, and are not impervious to get extortion fostered by religious law. This should not be
taken to suggest that the religious sphere is somehow more empowering to women, or even that it should be respected as a form of
“identity.” Rather, it indicates that any approach to marriage should
account for our finding that in some social contexts, religion can
prove to be just as empowering as the civil law. If allowing civil marriage may indeed be useful for women, the concrete impacts of given
policies need not be taken for granted.
Our field work also invites us to abandon the secularist conception of the “religious community as an association that members
join and quit at will,” 139 and favor instead conceptions of “agency . . .
embedded in religion.” 140 Thus, exit the figure of Amos Gitai’s character Malka, the young Orthodox woman who fled her community to
join Yaakov, the romantic gypsy rocker in the film Kadosh. Instead,
this article has attempted to depict the multiple voices of real Jewish
women struggling daily to make sense of an already constrained
social and relational environment. With this in mind, it is interesting to note that some scholarship on the agunah problem has rightly
focused on interpretations of religious texts to bring solutions to the
problem,141 acknowledging the importance of religious belonging and
not ceding to the temptation of secularist militancy. This should not,
however, imply any reification of the boundaries between civil law and
religion. Any policy response should acknowledge religious subjects’
multiple webs of identity and belonging, from the synagogue to the
movie theatre, across multiple spatial layers of identity.142 By restoring the importance of the religious sphere for Israeli women, we have
attempted to redraw a “map [which] ends up showing us that the very
form, purpose and effectiveness of boundaries are always dynamic.” 143
139. Richard J. Moon, Bruker v. Marcovitz: Divorce and the Marriage of Law and
Religion, 42 SUP. CT. L. REV. 37, 62 (2008).
140. See Korteweg, supra note 41, at 444, for a discussion on Muslim women’s agency.
141. See, e.g., Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a Jewish
Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 167–69 (1990) (suggesting that
the ideal solution would be to use “a conditional agency arrangement for delivery of a
get”); Clinton, supra note 117, at 287–88 (“For purposes of finding a solution to the
problem of agunah, legislative enactments . . . are the most useful.” (footnote omitted)).
142. See Davina Cooper, Talmudic Territory? Space, Law and Modernist Discourse, 23
J.L. & SOC’Y 529 passim (1996). On the geography of legal systems’ (and communities’)
boundaries, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 290 (1987).
143. Shauna Van Praagh, The Chutzpah of Chasidism, 11 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 193,
214 (1996).
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This new “map” of Israeli women’s multiple identities can be captured by the metaphoric figure of the old city of Jerusalem:
[T]he old city of Jerusalem, with its quarters and walls and, on the
Haram itself, its intimately protruding and abutting world views,
endlessly intersected and traversed by a still incomprehensible human history, offers up a good metaphor for an alternative place to
begin mapping the space at the intersection of several world views,
some historical, some secular, some religious.144

Therefore, the walls of the old city may be a more apt metaphor
for Jewish Israeli women’s encounter with civil and religious laws
than Kadosh’s sealed-off Mea Sharim community. This geography
of legal pluralism145 may be the key to refining our understanding
of Jewish Israeli women’s daily struggles, far from simplistic narratives of secular freedom and religious tyranny. For legal scholars to
be able to capture these complex social realities, expanding sociolegal field work amongst and inside religious communities seems
indispensable. Perhaps we can thus develop a new fruitful approach
to this over-theorized yet under-researched area of law, a new approach which takes into account the complexity of religious women’s
multiple layers of constraint and freedom, piety and rebelliousness,
oppression and resistance.

144. Susan Drummond, Prolegomenon to a Pedestrian Cartography of Mixed Legal
Jurisdictions: The Case of Israel/Palestine, 50 MCGILL L.J. 899, 947 (2005).
145. See Desmond Manderson, Interstices: New Work on Legal Spaces, 9 L. TEXT
CULTURE 1, 1 (2005).

